How the Iran War Exposes America’s Weakness: What Asian Nations Need to Know

Byung-woo Bae, Editorial Writer

The United States says it has destroyed roughly 10,000 targets inside Iran since the war began. Yet Iran’s missiles continue to strike nearby Gulf states and Israeli cities. Iran still controls the Strait of Hormuz.

The more desperate party is the United States. Alarmed by the economic and strategic fallout of a Hormuz blockade, Washington is racing to end the conflict. Iran, by contrast, understands that time is its ally. The longer the fight continues, the greater Iran’s leverage becomes from controlling the strait and disrupting global energy flows. That leverage could even influence President Donald Trump’s political fortunes in this November’s midterm elections. For the Iranian regime, mere survival amounts to strategic victory. Iran currently holds the initiative.

John Mearsheimer, the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago, was among the analysts who forecast an Iranian advantage from the outset. A leading voice of realist international relations, he dismissed U.S. and Israeli plans to neutralize Iran’s nuclear enrichment, dismantle its missile forces, and sever support to regional proxies such as the Houthi rebels by airstrikes as implausible.

Mearsheimer argues those aims would require a two-stage regime change: first ousting the current theocratic leadership, then installing a successor government that would reliably follow Washington’s and Jerusalem’s direction. Expecting air power alone to deliver that outcome is unrealistic. He has warned since the fighting began that, although the U.S. initiated combat operations, Iran will determine how and when the war ends. The conflict risks following a Vietnam-like arc—tactical wins but strategic failure—and so far events have validated that assessment. For Mearsheimer, this combines unattainable objectives, inappropriate means and no credible exit strategy: a war bound to fail.

America’s struggle in the Iran war will have broad implications for the global order. The crisis has exposed the limits of U.S. power. It shows that overwhelming force alone cannot guarantee strategic outcomes and underscores the potency of asymmetric weapons—missiles, drones and naval mines. It also highlights a political reality at home: operations that produce rising U.S. casualties and require prolonged deployments are politically unsustainable amid intense domestic polarization. That reality is a strategic boon for Russia, China and North Korea.

Even more damaging is the erosion of U.S. soft power. The U.S. strike on Iran has been framed by critics as a breach of international law; officials have not publicly presented clear evidence of an imminent Iranian attack that would justify the strikes as lawful self‑defense. The crisis has further revealed the hollowing out of the alliance system that underpins the U.S.-led order. As the war intensified and oil prices spiked, Washington asked allies to escort oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz—none agreed. Some allies pursued independent arrangements with Tehran to secure passage, a move viewed in Washington as effectively undercutting U.S. efforts. Much of this stems from years of public attacks on alliances by political leaders who accused partners of free‑riding; now the consequences are becoming evident. Without dependable allies, the United States can no longer expect to confront hostile powers alone; its unipolar primacy is challenged. Commenting on the alliance strain, Karla Norel, a political scientist at the University of Toronto, said American hegemony is collapsing before our eyes.

The U.S. dilemma in Iran will reverberate across Asia. Washington will be further tied down in the Middle East and exposed to Iran’s continuing threats that have crossed red lines. If control of the Strait of Hormuz effectively shifts to Tehran, the U.S. risks becoming a paper tiger. A national security strategy that treats China as the top priority could be undermined. It will take years to reconstitute the Asia‑Pacific force posture hollowed out by deployments to this conflict. Emboldened by U.S. vulnerabilities revealed in combat, China is likely to press its advantage—intensifying efforts to shape political and economic order in East and Southeast Asia. And a more brazen, nuclear‑armed North Korea will only complicate the region’s security calculus. In this more dangerous environment, Asian governments face an urgent question: who will fill the security gap left by a diminished U.S. presence?

Byung-woo Bae, Editorial Writer